

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Copys to Other binoculars
11-21. W.L. and*

November 7, 1962

To: William H. Brubeck

From: Bromley Smith

Will you please see that Ambassador Thompson is provided with a copy of the attached. Any additional distribution within the Department should be in accordance with Ambassador Thompson's instruction. He also has a copy of the Khrushchev letter of November 5.

DRAFT

11/6/62

(dictated by Captain Shepard)

Dear Mr. Chairman

I received your recent letter and I wish to give you as fully as

possible the strong feelings we have about the matter here.

In the first place, I need not tell you of the profound shock which

recent events have provided to relations between our two countries.

You may state, as Mr. Kuznetsov stated yesterday to Mr. McCloy,

that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any

activities it was carrying on in a third country. I ~~do not accept~~
^{cannot}

this view, nor would you if the activities being carried on in a third

country were intended to alter the balance of power in the world

upon which our present uneasy peace so much depends. The fact

of the matter, however, is not only were we not informed of events

in a third country, but active steps were taken to misinform us about

what was being done.

I am not now referring to the TASS article of September but to

the communications which were addressed to the highest levels

of our government through channels which heretofore had been used

for confidential communications from the highest levels of your

we

government. Through these channels were specifically informed

that no missiles would be placed in Cuba, which would have a range

^{approximately}
capable of reaching the United States. Believing that those represented

a commitment which would be met, I attempted, as you know, to

restrain those who were warning us of the trend of events in Cuba.

Then the inderivable evidence that offensive weapons were

[The fact that my government misjudged the course of events in Cuba
being installed was a deep and dangerous shock first
has given a most profound shock to my country.]

to our government and then to our whole people.

Let me ask you to consider how you would have felt
If there had been set up in Finland a government of increasing

if ^a even in Sweden

hostility to you, and then during the comparatively brief period,

and private

while public reassurances were being given as there had been

~~Finland~~ clandestinely sent to Cuba a whole variety of dangerous means

-3 - an action from our side. And that is how ~~the~~ action of your side in Cuba appears to us.
destruction of construction which had been belatedly discovered, you can have government + Soviet people would have reacted to such some idea of the feeling in this country. Now why then am I so

persistent in wanting this matter settled quickly and completely?

First, because in some measure I believe it vital that we reestablish some measure of confidence and communication between you and me. If leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with precision the intentions ^{some accuracy} of each other, we shall find of the other, this will mean an increasingly dangerous period for the ^{two of us.}

Secondly, in return for the commitments of yours I gave certain

commitments on behalf of the United States, among them that we would not invade Cuba. This commitment has been under attack,

and will become increasingly the object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. If after all we have gone through there remains

~~If ever I say the right thing if the~~ It

including Soviet personnel
remains. ^{a Soviet}
or leaves) in Cuba military bases which could quickly become offensive

SAM sites, heavy aircraft, large numbers of technicians, jet

^{and}
bombers, with a possibility that mobile missiles bases could quickly

be introduced. Combined with these facts is Castro's opposition to

UN on-the-ground-inspection and announced opposition to air

reconnaissance which at present gives us some degree of security.

Under these conditions, even though the missiles might be withdrawn

if the SAM sites remain, if the bombers remain, if a fishing harbor

is constructed which could

submarines, if Russian

technicians remain, if the Cubans object to air surveillance, use

SAM missiles against it and refuse to agree to on-the-ground inspection

then the whole threat could rise again in the period of a comparatively

few days and we would once again be faced with dangerous events.

Already we have reports of missiles being hidden in caves, although

I accept your word that they are not; of carriers and other